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Abstract 
 Your information is online. Secure? You are probably more succeptable than you 
believe. A large trust is placed on Web applications to securely store user information due 
to the prevalence of password-based authentication and current authentication protocols 
throughout the Web. The servers where this sensitive information resides are vulnerable. 
Zero-Knowledge Password Authentication offers the ability to discern and verify genuine 
users without transmission or storage of users’ passwords. But, time is a factor. The the 
amount of time required to obtain confident authentication of a user in the original 
implementation of Zero-Knowledge Password Authentication failed to keep the user’s flow 
uniterrupted. This paper proposes a protocol to reduce communication time by 
concatenating encrypted Zero-Knowledge Password Authentication challenges in an 
effort to minimize network overhead. With optimizations, Zero-Knowledge Password 
Authentication is on its way to rival conventional authentication protocol methodologies. 
 
 
Introduction 
 Everyone logs in. Modern day lives necessitate passwords. Most of the time, 
however, the security of the system beyond the front page is never really a forethought. 
What happens once your username and password leave your machine? In a standard 
password authentication model, some form of each password is stored on the sever in 
the back end so that the password can be compared for future logins. Servers are 
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vulnerable. But what happens if the server is compromised or malicious? Threat levels 
range signficantly, as seen in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 
Although most of the threats to a user are seemingly harmless, given proper motivation, 
malicous hackers are given the resources to greatly affect the security and lives of 
individuals. Access to the most sensitive account details can be prevented simply by not 
storing account passwords on the server. Hackers can’t steal what isn’t stored. 
 In an Internet driven society, authentication (ensuring an individual is who they 
claim to be) is a major conundrum. Providing the ability to discern and verify genuine 
users amid mistyped passwords and hackers, while protecting their security and trust 
from data breaches, appears seemingly insurmountable1. Does authentication require the 
transmission and storage of users’ passwords? What if a user’s identity could be verified 
within a statistically insignificant margin of error? Zero-Knowledge Password 
Authentication (ZKPA) provides a method for verifying users with a server without 
revealing or passing along any information regarding the users other than the fact that 
the users know their password. 
  
                                            
1 "Passwords," “Threats to Passwords.” 
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Requirements 
 By definition, ZKPA must satisfy three properties: completeness, soundness and 
zero-knowledge. To statisfy completeness, a verifier must be convinced by an honest 
client possessing the password. In other words, a correct authentication attempt must 
result in successful authentication of a genuine user. Enforcing that an honest verifier will 
not be convinced by a malicious client not possessing the password (aside from a 
statistically insignificant probability) satisfies the property of soundness. Put another way, 
an legitimate server will not authenticate a malicious client attempting to simulate, hack 
or otherwise circumvent the password authentication. Finally, to satisfy zero-knowledge, 
a malicious verifier must not learn anything from an honest client possessing the 
password other than the fact that they possess it. Meaning, upon attempted 
authentication with a password, a malicious server will not learn anything from a genuine 
user other than the fact they possess the password2,3,4. 
Implementation 
 As with most cryptographic algorithms, ZKPA relies on computational assumptions 
of cyclical groups. Prime order groups are typically implemented since groups of prime 
order are cyclic. One possible implementation takes advantage of relative primes 
invertable through modulo multiplication. Further, composite order groups, comprised of 
two distinct primes, reveals cardinality through modulo muliplication. A final possible 
implementation enacts an ellipical curve over a prime-field with similar properties of 
                                            
2 "Zero-knowledge Proof," “Definition.” 
3 Kiefer, "Advancements in Password-based Cryptography,” 37. 
4 Kurmi and Sodhi, "A Survey of Zero-Knowledge," 494-500. 
- 4 - 
inversion from an abelian group5. Each method has it’s own advantages and 
disadvantages, however, for simplicity, we will use an implementation of composite order 
groups through discrete logarithm. 
 The interface of the proposed system is familiar and identical to that of which is 
currently widely accepted. A user logs in with a username and password on a form as 
seen in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 
Maintaining the same username and password model opens the door for current content 
providers to implement such a system with limited impact on both the user and the content 
provider. User’s will be able to login as they normally would–by entering their username 
and password in the form and clicking login. However, the interface is where the similarity 
ends.  
 On the other end, content providers would not store passwords but instead a 
distributed key value that is a function of the password. Doing so, the calculation for 
                                            
5 Kiefer, "Advancements in Password-based Cryptography,” 21-23. 
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authentication reveal nothing but random numbers. Even having access to the database 
does not gleam any information about a user’s password.  
 When a user wishes to attempt to login, the user enters their username and 
password on their machine. The following execution of the ZKPA algorithm takes place:  
Given a value y, a large prime p and a generator g, such that  , 
assuming the value of y is already distributed to the verifier, such that at a later time, 
proving knowledge of x is equivalent to proving identity of the user. 
1. The user’s machine calculates the hash of their password, x.  
2. For each iteration 
a. The user’s machine generates a random number r, computes C, such that
, and discloses C to the server. 
b. The server then issues one of the following two challenges: 
i. The server requests the value of r from the user. 
ii. Or, the value of  . 
c. The user’s machine generates the response to the challenge for the server. 
d. The server verifies the response: 
i. If r was requested, the server can compute  and verify that it 
matches C. 
ii. If  was requested, the server can verify that C is 
consistent with this, by computing  and verifying 
that it matches . 
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Therefore, “by executing a large enough number of interations, the probability of a 
malicious client succeeding in false authentication can be made arbitrarily low6,7,8.” 
Probablitiy 
 In any particular single instance, a malicious user has a 50% probability of 
guessing the challenge correctly9, however, with each additional iteration, the overall 
probability of simply guessing all correct challenges becomes increasingly small, as seen 
in Figure 3 below. The probability of correctly guessing the challenges decreases 
exponentially based on a function of the number of iterations completed ( 
1
2𝑛
 , where n is 
the number of iterations). 
 
Figure 3 
                                            
6 "Zero-knowledge Proof," “Practical Examples.” 
7 Nyguyen, Rudoy, and Srinivasan, "Two Factor Zero Knowledge Proof," 2-4. 
8 Kurmi and Sodhi, "A Survey of Zero-Knowledge," 494-500. 
9 "Zero-knowledge Proof," “Practical Examples.” 
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If the server issues a challenge to the malicous user other than the one they were 
expecting, the complexity of formulating the expected response without the password is 
on the order of solving the discrete logarithm problem. Therefore, if the user fails to 
complete the requested challenges as expected, the server can be confident the user 
does not have the password. To the contrary, if a user repeatedly completes the 
requested challenges as expected for enough iterations, the server can conclude with 
great certainty that the user possesses the password within a statistically insignificant 
margin of error. 
 It is important to note that the implementation this paper chose is simplified. More 
complex algorithms produce a more drastic fall-off on the probability curve. To reduce the 
probability of a malicous user guessing the requested challenges as expected for each 
iteration, an algorithm must be formed that expects more than two possible responses to 
the challenges. Doing so effectively increases the complexity to a function of 
1
𝑃𝑛
 , where 
P is the number of possible responses to a challenge and n is the number of iterations. 
An example of an implementation with higher single-iteration complexity is the 
Modification of Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Algorithm for Zero-Knowledge Protocol10. 
 Another important analysis is the threat consideration of standard password 
authentication protocols. Given any arbitrary username and password on the Internet, the 
probability that they are compromised is not zero. Standard password authentication 
protocols can verify a password’s correctness with absolute certainty, whereas ZKPA can 
only become confident in the password within a statistically insignificant margin of error. 
                                            
10 Kurmi and Sodhi, "A Survey of Zero-Knowledge," 497-499. 
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However, the amount of time that the password is exposed to threat in standard password 
authentication protocols is much greater, leaving them more suceptible. In the 
implementation of ZKPA, by not having any form of the password saved on the server, 
the avenue of attack is greatly reduced. Secondly, the amount of time for a given attempt 
of ZKPA is not instantaneous; therefore, an attack on the avaliable front, say for example 
bruteforce, would take significantly longer than a standard password authentication 
protocol. Nonetheless, simple password attempt limiting techniques could easily mitigate 
such attacks. In the end, ZKPA proves to be less suceptible to password related threats. 
Performance 
 “An important challenge for [ZKPA is] to satisfy the existing response-time 
standards. Such a standard was proposed in 1968 by Miller11. He defined three main time 
constraints: 0.1 second is for keeping the user attention attracted; 1 second is for keeping 
a user flow though uninterrupted; Finally, 10 seconds for keeping user's attention on the 
dialog. Three decades after his findings, those rules are still applicable…12” 
 The main drawback of ZKPA is in fact performance. In implementation, ZKPA 
failed to keep the user’s flow uniterrupted; and, in some circumstances, even failed to 
meet the time requirement to keep the user’s attention. Each ZKPA iteration took 
aproximately 400ms on a desktop machine and 600ms on a mobile device (Figure 4). 
The response time for an individual iteration ranged from 57ms to 1230ms on desktop 
and 356ms to1860ms on mobile (see Appendix). Since similar computations occurend in 
                                            
11 Miller. Response time. 
12 Grzonkowski, Zaremba, Zaremba, and Mcdaniel. "Extending Web Applications." 4. 
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each iteration, the variance in timings for each iteration can be accounted largely to 
network overhead. 
 
Figure 4 
 Altogether, the combined iteration time required to confidently verify a genuine 
user challenged the user’s attention even in the best case. ZKPA took 8.5 seconds to 
complete on a desktop machine and 12.8 seconds on a mobile device (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5 
In order to obtain a 1 second response time, the algorithm would need to see a 90 – 95% 
reduction in time required for confident authentication. Improvement of that magnitude is 
not likely; however, the proprosed additions that follow will reduce the amount of network 
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communication trips down from two per iteration (for a total of 40 over 20 iterations) down 
to a total of twp trips from client to server with a larger concatenated challenge request. 
Additions 
 In an effort to reduce network overhead while still statifying the requirements of 
ZKPA, each challenge must be calculated independently and answered correctly prior to 
receiving the next challenge. By employing a Triple-DES block cipher to encrypt the 
random iteration challenges with cipher block chaining, such requirements will be 
satisfied. In turn, by sending all of the challenges at once, the network overhead is 
reduced to two trips independent of the number of iterations challenges sent. 
 As shown in Figure 6, the implementation will function largely the same. The user 
will first enter their username and password into the browser. The server receives the 
request and generates the random iteration challenges. However, instead of generating 
the iterations one at a time, the sever generates all of the iteration challenges at once and 
concatenates them together in an encrypted block. By employing cipher block chaining, 
the initialization vector for each challenge will be different; however, by basing the 
initialization vector on the correct response to each subsequently previous challenge, the 
server can ensure the user’s machine can not gleam any useful information out of future 
challenges. Therefore, the user’s machine’s response for a given iteration is required to 
be correct for the user to decrypt the next challenge correctly. If any response is incorrect, 
subsequent challenges will be misinturpreted upon decryption and the user’s machine will 
essentially be providing a response to the wrong question. Once the responses have 
been formulated for each challenge by the user’s machine, the response is sent back to 
the server for verification. If all of the responses are correct, the user is authenticated and 
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the server can be confident within a statistically insignificant margin of error that the user 
does in fact have the password. To the contrary, if any one response is incorrect, the 
server can be entirely confident the user does not possess the password. 
 
Figure 6 
  
Conclusion 
 In cosidering security beyond the login form, how users’ paswords are handled 
matters. Everyone logs in; therefore, passwords are a necessity in most people’s lives. In 
a standard password authentication model, some form of each password is stored on the 
sever in the back end so that the password can be compared for future logins. Doing so 
leaves open the possibility for malicous activity in obtaining their password through 
common server attacks. Access to the most sensitive account details can be prevented 
simply by not storing account passwords on the server. By not storing the information, it 
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is then not avaliable to be obtained by a malicious individual by means of hacking the 
server. 
 Due to the prevalence of password-based authentication and current 
authentication protocols throughout the Web, as it stands, a large trust is placed on Web 
applications to securely store user information. ZKPA offers the ability to discern and 
verify genuine users without transmission or storage of users’ passwords. However, the 
limiting factor for ZKPA is the amount of time required to obtain confident authentication 
of a user. This paper proposed a protocol to reduce communication time by concatenating 
encrypted challenges. Future work in reducing computation and communication costs in 
an effort to minimize average total time for ZKPA will allow ZKPA to rival conventional 
authentication protocol methodologies. 
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Appendix 
Desktop iteration times across five trials: 
  
  
DESKTOP 1 2 3 4 5 AVG
Init 106 117 177 120 150 134
1 388 663 837 682 170 548
2 171 357 166 598 657 389.8
3 92 57 754 674 362 387.8
4 400 145 108 571 428 330.4
5 321 369 592 126 479 377.4
6 401 661 537 642 788 605.8
7 212 465 61 769 516 404.6
8 688 209 617 137 403 410.8
9 694 90 623 661 277 469
10 585 682 65 482 267 416.2
11 1230 470 152 705 659 643.2
12 584 296 139 149 557 345
13 392 507 125 575 449 409.6
14 107 695 277 327 465 374.2
15 139 66 101 702 93 220.2
16 351 299 396 356 192 318.8
17 811 570 195 531 898 601
18 747 196 111 324 836 442.8
19 105 124 227 435 374 253
20 598 461 322 697 59 427.4
SUM 9.122 7.499 6.582 10.263 9.079 8.509
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Mobile iteration times across five trials: 
  
 
Desktop iteration min, max, average, and standard deviation: 
  
 
Mobile iteration min, max, average, and standard deviation: 
  
MOBILE 1 2 3 4 5 AVG
Init 411 588 583 413 447 488.4
1 554 506 537 511 453 512.2
2 660 427 412 724 731 590.8
3 600 729 447 648 547 594.2
4 1540 403 405 842 551 748.2
5 361 454 449 502 467 446.6
6 464 878 451 450 640 576.6
7 458 700 546 455 818 595.4
8 460 930 375 452 377 518.8
9 460 495 469 871 721 603.2
10 581 698 449 739 423 578
11 923 645 759 498 446 654.2
12 930 600 411 657 464 612.4
13 1410 631 456 455 451 680.6
14 1860 744 446 452 447 789.8
15 1120 356 604 559 728 673.4
16 929 601 540 371 424 573
17 581 564 836 473 509 592.6
18 843 489 553 686 640 642.2
19 554 788 835 561 687 685
20 872 559 565 361 728 617
SUM 16.571 12.785 11.128 11.68 11.699 12.7726
Min 57
Max 1230
Average 405.19
Std Dev 247.35
DESKTOP
Min 356
Max 1860
Average 608.22
Std Dev 235.68
MOBILE
